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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

MARCELLA RAE GRIFFIN,

Case No.

16669

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, MARCELLA RAE GRIFFIN, appeals from
her conviction of the crime

of Aggravated Robbery in the

District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the Honorable David
B. Dee, Judge presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following trial by jury the Court entered judgment
of guilty for the crime of Aggravated Robbery against the
appellant, and subsequently committed appellant to the Utah
State Prison for the term as provided by law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the lower Court's
conviction reversed and to have the case remanded to the
Third Judicial District Court for a new trial, or in the
alternative, to have the matter dismissed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the 18th day of July, 1978 the patrons of a
beauty salon known as the House of Sherman were robbed by
two armed gunmen who were wearing disguises.

Just previous

to the time of the robbery various police officers had been
following the black and silver Camaro containing four persoru
in the area of the House of Sherman.

Shortly after arriving

at that vicinity, police officers lost contact with the cu.
Subsequently, Detective Labrum of the Salt Lake County Sherif'.
Office relocated the car and observed Marcella Griffin come
from the area of the House of Sherman, carrying several purses
After contacting other law enforcement agents, Detective Labr;
proceeded into the House of Sherman where he was confronted
by an armed man who appeared to be black with an Afro, and
disarmed Detective Labrum, and subsequently handcuffed him wit'
his own handcuffs, and both robbers fled the area.

Shortly

thereafter law enforcement officers stopped the black and siW
Camaro containing Cindy Vigil and Marcella Griffin, and locatec
several of the purses taken in the robbery in the vehicle.

-2-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

When Marcella Griffin was taken into custody,
she subsequently gave police officers permission to enter
her residence for the purpose of securing her children, and
checking for the presence"of two suspects.
taken to the police station.

Mrs. Griffin was

Police officers

to her house and waited for some time.

proceeded

Subsequently, the

defendants Shawn Henline and Dennis Griffin were apprehended
at the home of Marcella Griffin.

An athletic type bag

containing certain evidence was seized, a second vehicle was
lillpounded and a search of that vehicle revealed additional
evidence later identified as having come from the robbery
of the House of Sherman.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
POLICE OFFICERS EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF CONSENT
GIVEN BY APPELLANT TO ENTER HER PREMISES FOR
EXPRESS PURPOSES AND EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM
THE SEARCH WHICH EXCEEDED THOSE PURPOSES
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED.
The law enforcement agents were allowed to enter
the home of Marcella Griffin, appellant, to take care of the
children, and to check to see if the suspects were in the home.
After they had performed the function for which they had been
given permission, they remained on the premises with the express
intention of waiting for the arrival of the co-defendants,
Dennis Griffin and Shawn Henline.

The officers arrested the

co-defendants and seized a duffle bag at the home of appellant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The motion to suppress the duffle bag was denied and that
evidence was used to convict appellant.

It is the

contention of the appellant that the actions of the law
enforcement agents exceeded their authority and was in
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution proscribing unreasonable searches and seizures,
together with the federal exclusionary doctrine, is obligatory
upon the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,

81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961).

The Fourth Amendment

requires the issuance of a warrant based upon probable cause
before a search may be conducted.

However, there are

exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements.
A search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutiona:
permissible and is an established exception to the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment requirements of both a warrant and
probable cause.

Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 1973, 412 U.S.

218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed. 2d 854; State v. White, 577 P.2d
552, (Utah, 1978).

However, the practice of substituting

consent for the authorization of a serach warrant is not viewec
favorably by the courts, United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.Lc
126, 129 (7th Cir., 1971), particularly where no reason is
shown why a search warrant was not obtained.
Arrington, 215 F.2d 630, 637 (7th Cir., 1954).

United

See also

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

State~

Catalanotte v. United States, 208 F.2d 264, 268 (1953),
where the Sixth Circuit Court expressed a similar sentiment.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "police
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval
of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure."
Terry v. Ohio,
889 (1968).

392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d

The Tenth Circuit Court, in setting out the

specifics necessary to sustain the Government's burden to
establish justification for a warrantless search based on
consent, stated that "the courts will indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights", and there must be convincing evidence
that such rights were waived.

Villano v. United States,

310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir., 1962).
Thus, the Statehas the burden of showing that the
accused's rights were not violated by reason of an improper
search.

This extends not only to the validity of the consent

but to the scope of the sonsent as well.

Appellant contends

that police officers exceeded the scope of the consent given
them to search her residence, and the State has failed to
sustain the burden that it acted within the scope of

consent.

The Tenth Circuit Court applied the Villano criteria in
United States v. Abbot, 546 F.2d 863 (1977), to determine that
the government failed to show that they had not improperly
searched beyond the scope of the consent given by the accused's
wife.

The defendant's conviction was reversed with directions
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to sustain the motion to suppress.

The Seventh Circuit

has also stated the rule that the government has the burden
of showing that it acted within the scope of defendant's
consent in United States v. Dichiarinte, supra, a 1 eading
case on consent searches.

Accord, State v. Koucoules, 343

A.2d 860 (Mo., 1974).
The rule regarding the scope of consent searches
is stated generally:
When the police are relying upon consent
as the basis for their warrantless search
they have no more authority than they hav~
been given by the consent.
It is thus
important to take account of any express
or implied limitations or qualifications
attendin that consent which establishes
t e permissi e scope o the search in
terms of such matters as time, duration,
area, or intensity.
Lafave, Search and
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment (1978) Vol. 2, §8.1 Consent
Searches, p. 624.
(Emphasis Supplied)
. Though consent can legitimize what would be an otherwise illega:
and unreasonable search, the search is reasonable only to the
extent that the accused has consented.

This rule is recognized

and applied in three of the leading consent search cases.
In McNear v. Rhay, 398 P.2d 732 (Wash., 1965), it was held
that a search which exceeds the scope of the consent is
unreasonable and in violation of defendant's constitutional
rights.

The Court determined that the evidence procurred as
The
a result of the unreasonable search should be suppressed.
defendant in McNear was arrested for shoplifting.

After

he was booked, he was asked to sign a consent form which, in
broad terms, granted to the police the authorization to search
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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his apartment for stolen goods.

They discovered no stolen

goods, but did discover a marijuana cigarette.

Officers

from the narcotics squad arrived shortly thereafter, and
after confirming the content of the cigarette as marijuana,
a search for additional narcotics began.

The Court, in

determining that the search for narcotics was unreasonable
because it was beyond the scope of consent, stated:
In this respect, the testimony is undisputed
that the official request for the consent
to search was predicated solely upon a belief
that stolen property, in the nature of
"shoplifted" articles, would be found.
Petitioner was so informed by a member of the
larceny detail and signed the consent with
that understanding. Under such circumstances,
the consent to search, which under any
circumstances amounts to no more than a
waiver of a search warrant, was limited in
its scope, despite the all-encompassing
language thereof. It would not and could
not su ort a eneral ex lorator search
or seizure.
aron, Searc es Seizures-.and
IImllunities, Ch. IV, §3(c), p. 31, 398 P.Zd at
738.
(Emphasis Supplied)

2

The scope of a consent search is limited much like a search
warrant is limited.

Police officers are only allowed to

search for those items listed in the warrant.

In the case of

a consent search, where the request for consent is predicated
on the search of specific items, the police officers are not
authorized to search further and conduct a "general exploratory
search."

The Seventh Circuit Court, in United States v.

Dichiarinte, supra, has also noted the

parallel between a

search warrant and a consent se·arch in terms of the limitations

-7-
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imposed on both:
A defendant's consent may limit the
extent or scope of a warrantless search
in the same way that the specifications
of a warrant limit a search pursuant to
that warrant.
445 F.2d at 129.
Additionally, the Court continued:
Our holding that the search was
unreasonable because it went beyond the
scope of defendant's consent would be the
same if the agents had conducted the
search under a search warrant.
445 F. 2d at 130.
The Court in State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860
(Mo., 1974), determined from defendant's words and actions
that she placed no limitations on her consent to search and
the search that followed was well within the broad scope
of consent which defendant impliedly defined.

In that case,

defendant called police officers to her home where they
discovered her husband's body with a bullet wound in the head.
Officers asekd defendant's permission to search the home and
she consented.

Defendant was not a suspect at the time, and

hence imposed no limitations on the search.

In fact, she left

with friends while the police officers were searching, a fact
the Court read as her indifference to the presence of the polic<
in her home.

In view of her indifference, the Court concluded

her consent was broad and unlimited.

The Court noted, citing

several cases, the rule that "the scope of a consent search
is limited by the bounds, and determined by the breadth,
of actual consent itself."

General and broad consent has been

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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found to exist when defendant, in response to a request
by police to simply search, gives authorization to "look
around".

Lamb v. State, 516 P. 2d 1405 (Nev., 1973),

"go ahead and find it"

(stolen property), State v. Rye,

471 P.2d 96 (Wash., 1970), or "be my guest", State v.
Johnson, 427 P.2d 705 (Wash, 1967).

Note, however, that

is all these cases, the police officers made no representations
about the specific objects or purpose of their search.
Ordinarily, a limitation is not expressly stated by the
consenting party.

Rather it arises by implication from the

fact that the consent is being sought for a particular
purpose.

The Courts will look at the facts and circumstances

to determine if they give rise to a limit by implication.
McNear v. Ray, supra, State v. Koucoules, supra.

When a

purpose is included in the request, then the consent must
be construed as authorizing only the intensity of police
activity necessary to accomplish the stated purpose.

In

United States v. Dichiarinte, supra, the Court so held,
stating:
The evidence at the suppression hearings
contains repeated reference to the agents
interest in narcotics; and there was no
indication that they desired to look for
anything other than narcotics themselves .
Under these circumstances, defendant's
statement that the agents could "come over
to the house and look"must be taken to mean
at most that they might come and conduct
only such a search as would be necessa:y
to establish whether he had any narcotics.
Government a ents ma not obtain consent
resentation t at t e
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items and subsequently, use that consent
as a license to conduct a general exploratory
search.
445 F.2d at 129 (Emphasis Supplied)
The effect of this is that the police officer himself may
limit the scope of the search and the defendant consents
only to the extent that the police officer has indicated
in his request.

In Dichiarinte,

the defendant consented

to a search of his home in response to a police inquiry
whether he had any narcotics.

The police, in the course of

their search, opened and read incriminating documents which
led to defendant's conviction for income tax evasion.

The

Seventh Circuit Court held that the evidence should have

be~

suppressed.
The Tenth Circuit Court in United States v. Abbott,
supra, viewed the surrounding facts and circumstances to find
an implied limitation on defendant's wife's consent to search.
As stated above, defendant does not ordinarily expressly
limit his consent, however,the facts and circumstances must
be viewed to determine whether a limitation has arisen by
implication.
Applying the preceding case law to the facts of the
instant case, the appellant contends first, that assuming that
the consent was valid, it was nonetheless limited.

The

limitation on the scope of the consent search arose by
implication.

The officer asked if the police officers could

enter the Griffin home for two distinct purposes, and Mrs.
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Griffin, the appellant, answered in the affirmative.

The

police officer himself limited the scope when she asked
for permission to enter her home.

Police Officer Carl

Voyles, Salt Lake City, Police Department, testified:
A. At this time [after Ms. Griffin's arrest
just outside her home] I was informed that
there was a problem of children in the home
these children being hers. And I asked
'
her at this time if we could go to her home,
obtain the children for safekeeping, and also,
make a search for the suspects in the
situation.

Q.

What was her response?

A.

She indicated, yes.

(T. 846).

The officer asked for entry into the home for two express
purposes.

First, to remove the children from the home for

safekeeping and

second, as Police Officer Voyles stated on

direct examination "to see if the suspect Henline was still
in the house and to make the area safe."

(T. 851).

Appellant

consented to an entry into the privacy of her home for those
two purposes.

Once those purposes were accomplished, the

police officers had no further authorization to search.
Consequently, their subsequent seizure of the duffle bag was
unreasonable and the trial court should not have denied
defendant's motion to suppress.

(T. 865).

The case law requires that the surrounding facts
and circumstances be viewed to determine if there is in fact,
a limit on the scope of the consent search.

In addition to

Police Officer Voyles limiting the scope of search in his
request, there is also the fact that appellant, once arrested,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

was concerned with the welfare of her children.

Thus, when

asked if the children could be removed ' she would ' of co urse,
consent to that. The record shows that appellant herself
understood her consent as limited for purpose of entering
the home to get her children

(T. 835).

But even assuming

that the officer also requested to search for the suspects
and make the area safe, the co-defendant probably, and
reasonably, concluded that when the officers entered the home
for the children, they might look for the suspects as well,
since they were already on the premises and could not ignore
them once they were there.

Appellant consented then to a

single entry on the premises for those two purposes.

She

was arrested and being taken to jail, therefore, i t is unlikely
that she was indifferent or consenting to the police officers'
extended stay on her premises.

The police officer's took

the appellant's lililited consent and used it as a license to
conduct what amounts to a surveillance and a general explorator::
search.

Police officer Voyles limited the scope of the

consent search (T.846, 858).

He admitted that a search

for evidence of the robbery or any other search except that
directed to determine if the suspects were in the home was
a "different thing".

Voyles also testified that they did

not have permission to search the home for items as evidence
of robbery.

(T. 848-850).

Officer Kenneth L. Thirsk, of the

Salt Lake City Police Department, later testified that he
arrived at the premises after it had already been entered
and that he then made the decision to remain on the premises
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(T. 858).

He also testified that Detective Darrell M.

Ondrak did not inform him of the limited permission to
enter the home (which police officers Voyles had previously
obtained from Ms. Griffin)

(T. 850).

Thirsk also

testified that they waited an hour and a half for the suspects
to return (T. 860).

In other words, they were no longer

searching for the purposes for which consent was given.
That search had ended once it was determined that the suspects
were not in the home.

The police officers continued presence

on the premises and subsequent seizure of the duffle bag were
actions beyond the actual consent given.

Thirsk also

testified that he directed Officer Voyles to go to the jail
and obtain a written consent from appellant.

Thirsk interpreted

that request for written consent as a "verification" of
the previous oral consent (T. 861).

Yet Officer Voyles,

the police officer who obtained and limited the consent to
enter the premises interpreted the request for a written consent
as a request to search the appellant's home - a search that
had not been previously consented to (T. 850, 851).

One

officer received limited consent while another officer interpreted
that consent to allow a general.exploratory search.

Then

the State contends that the officers wanted to verify that
search in writing when, in viewing the inconsistent testimony
of the officers, they were, in fact, seeking a consent for
a search already conducted, but in excess of the consent given.
The rule of law is that the State must carry the
burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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search and seizure of evidence does not exceed the scope
of consent.

Appellant contends that the State has not met

this burden.

The State has offered the testimony of two

officers which is conflicting in terms of what the scope
of consent was.

The subsequent interpretation of the consent

obtained is not controlling, however.

What is controlling

is the representation made by the officer requesting the seu~
and the appellant's consent to that limited search.

The

officers admittedly remained on the premises after the
search was made therefore, beyond the scope of the consent.
The seizure of the duffle bag during the time the officers
were illegally on the premises was unreasonable and should
not have been allowed into evidence in violation of the
appellant's constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
The trial judge concluded that the motion to
suppress should be denied because the seizure of the duffle
bag was incident to arrest of Shawn Henline and Dennis Griffin.
co-defendants in this case.

The judge, however, failed to

address the question of the scope of consent.

As appellant

contends above, since the scope of the consent was exceeded,
any seizure after that was unreasonable and the evidence
procurred from the illegal presence on the premises is
"tainted" with illegality and hence should not be admissible.
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (19ZO);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

A subsequent
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arrest should not be used to try to validate the seizure
that was initially illegal.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out in the petition above,
the appellant asserts that the conviction should be reversed,
or in the alternative, the appellant should be granted a
new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

LYNN R. BROWN
Attorney for Appellant
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